

# An Attempt to Reconcile Three Theories of the Origin of Finite Things in *De Summa Rerum*

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## Introduction

The authors of two recent works, focused upon the discussions in *De Summa Rerum* (hereafter DSR), have argued that Leibniz once introduced a monistic metaphysics, according to which God is the only substance. Robert Adams takes note of *That a Perfect Thing is Possible* from DSR, in which Leibniz asserted “[i]t can easily be demonstrated that all things are distinguished, not as substances (i.e., radically) but as modes” (A VI iii, 573 = DSR 93; Adams 1994, p. 129). In commenting on this passage, Adams has argued that Leibniz had come to a “monistic conclusion” (ibid.). By referring to the same passage, Mogens Laerke also suggests that Leibniz held a quasi-Spinozistic system of metaphysics at that time (Laerke 2008, p. 444; pp. 507-8).<sup>1</sup> Here some readers of their works might be tempted to conclude that when Leibniz wrote DSR he held a stable system of metaphysics, in which we can find many claims that he was explicitly committed to, and one of the claims is that there is only one substance, namely God. But it is not clear whether we can appropriately interpret DSR as presenting a unified system, given that DSR is a collection of relatively short articles, which was first named so in the Academy Edition. If Leibniz had written DSR as a single work, which is obviously not the case, we would be more confident in taking it to present a solid system of metaphysics. While Mark Kulstad considers Adams’ reading of the passage as showing a monistic inclination,<sup>2</sup> he also notices that in DSR there are actually three distinct theories concerning the origin of finite things:

It is my belief that this idea of relating a single attribute to all others to give rise to the infinite variety of the world is one of several at least nominally different Leibnizian answers to be the question of how the variety of the world arises from the forms or attributes of God present in the *De Summa Rerum*, and that answering this question is one of the driving forces of the *De Summa Rerum*.... What we will do in this section is to start by developing some details of the answer that we have already encountered in connection with the correspondence between Tschirnhaus and Spinoza (an answer which, for reasons that will become clearer later, we will label the ‘pure relations theory’). The sort of numerical analogy just mentioned will be central

1 More precisely, Laerke uses the term “quasi-spinozisme” or “système quasi-spinoziste.”

2 Kulstad notes that according to Adams, as well as his own reading of DSR, “Leibniz did not have a traditional view of creation,” and he “adopted at least temporarily a Spinozistic and pantheistic view of the things of this world as modes of God rather than as distinct substance” (Kulstad 1999, p. 70).

in this. Then we will raise some questions about details that will lead us to what appears to be a related but distinct answer to the question of the origin of things (which we shall label the ‘subjects theory’). Finally we will turn to an answer which, in at least in one of its formulations, seems the furthest removed from the idea on origins suggested in Tschirnhaus’s letter to Spinoza of June 23, 1676. (We shall label this final approach the ‘matter theory.’) [Kulstad 1999, pp. 77-8]

Following Kulstad, Laerke has made the following observation concerning distinct theories of the origin of finite things:

Leibniz occasionally advanced a plurality of hypotheses, which were proposed simultaneously in the same texts. These diverse explanations are not exclusive to each other, but rather they constitute steps in a reasoning which Leibniz constantly improved. By following an analysis proposed by Mark Kulstad, we find four distinct explanations: (1) the first explanation only refers to *the essence of God*, making things properties that necessarily follow from the essence of God; (2) the second refers to *a conjugation of simple forms*; (3) in addition, we find an explanation that *combines a subject with forms*; (4) finally, an explanation that *adds the matter to forms*.<sup>3</sup> [Laerke 2008, p.518]

As Kulstad and Laerke do, I notice several passages in DSR that seem to present different explanations on how finite things are produced. As we have seen, since DSR is a collection of short articles, it might be the case that Leibniz tried to write down different hypotheses for the purpose of forming a more stable and systematic metaphysics later on. Here we have an interpretative problem. That is, if we take DSR as presenting incoherent hypotheses, then we may not be able to ascribe a stable view to Leibniz based on DSR, since in that case it seems that Leibniz did not seriously commit what he wrote. Thus, for instance, it may be hard to ascribe what Laerke calls the “quasi-Spinozistic system” to Leibniz on the basis of DSR. But as Laerke does, I assume that DSR will look even more attractive if it presents an early version of Leibniz’s system. In this paper, I attempt to present possible readings of some important passages in DSR, so that we can take seemingly distinct theories as fitting together.

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3 “Leibniz avance plusieurs hypothèses, parfois proposées simultanément dans les mêmes textes. Ces explications diverses ne sont pas exclusives les unes des autres, mais constituent plutôt des étapes dans un raisonnement que Leibniz perfectionne constamment. En suivant une analyse proposée par Mark Kulstad, nous décelons quatre explications distinctes: (1) la première explication se réfère uniquement à *l’essence de Dieu*, en faisant des choses des propriétés qui suivent nécessairement de l’essence de Dieu; (2) la seconde renvoie à *une conjugaison des formes simples*; (3) nous trouvons en outre une explication qui *joint un sujet aux formes*; (4) enfin, une explication qui *ajoute la matière aux formes*.”

# 1. Kulstad's Distinction of Three Theories on the Origin of Finite Things

## 1.1 Pure Relations Theory

Kulstad cites a passage from *On Simple Forms* in which Leibniz wrote:

There is the same variety in any kind of world, and this is nothing other than the same essence related in various ways, as if you were to look at the same town from various places; or, if you relate the essence of the number 6 to the number 3, it will be  $3 \times 2$  or  $3 + 3$ , but if you relate it to the number 4 it will be  $6/4 = 3/2$ , or  $6 = 4 \times 3/2$ . [A VI iii, 522 = DSR 83; Kulstad 1999, p. 78]

In this passage, Leibniz explains how “various things” are brought about by the same essence of things, which consists in an infinite number of simple forms of God. In *On Simple Forms*, Leibniz previously wrote that “there are infinitely various things,” and the “infinite variety can result only from an infinite cause, that is, from various forms” (A VI iii, 522 = DSR 83). On the basis of this fact, Leibniz argued that “simple forms are infinitely many” (ibid.). In another article *On Forms, or the Attributes of God* of DSR, Leibniz stated that “[a]n attribute of God is any simple form” (A VI iii, 514 = DSR 69), which implies that any simple form must belong to God as his attribute.<sup>4</sup> Leibniz added that “the essence of God consists in the fact that he is the subject of all compatible attributes” (ibid.). Thus, Leibniz thinks that God has an infinite number of simple forms or attributes, and the whole set of the simple forms is considered as the essence of God. The number 6 in the passage of *On Simple Forms* is a metaphor of God's essence or the whole set of all the simple forms, while according to Kulstad, the number 3 is associated with one of the simple forms or attributes (Kulstad 1999, p. 79). The passage seems to suggest how various things are produced by introducing some simple form related to the set of all the forms. For Kulstad, given the analogy of the passage, “nothing else is needed for the origin of things other than the relation of attributes, taken singly, to all attributes taken together” (Kulstad 1999, p. 80). Thus the theory introduced in the passage of *On Simple Forms* is called the “pure relations theory.”

## 1.2 Subjects Theory

Kulstad states that “[s]ome passages of the *De Summa Rerum* suggest relations involved in the origin of things extending beyond those of the pure relations theory, that is, relations which have as ‘relata’ entities distinct from the forms or attributes of God” (Kulstad 1999, p. 80). Here Kulstad quotes the following passage:

Things are not produced by the mere combination of forms in God, but along with a subject also. The subject itself, or God, together with his ubiquity, gives the immeasurable, and this immeasurable combined with other subjects bring it about that all possible modes, or things, follow in it. The various results of forms,

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<sup>4</sup> In *On Forms, or the Attributes of God*, Leibniz used “form” and “attribute” as synonyms, as we can guess from the very title. For instance, he wrote that “[i]t is a wondenul fact that a subject is different from forms or attributes” (A VI iii, 514 = DSR 69).

combined with a subject, bring it about the particulars result. [A VI iii, 523 = DSR 85]

According to the subjects theory, various things require the subject, or the holder of all the simple forms. The theory seems to suggest that relations of forms are not enough for producing various things, and these various things must be related to the subject or God, in addition to the set of all the forms. Another distinct feature of the passage of the subjects theory is that the expression “other subjects” is used. Kulstad takes note of this expression as the following:

The key question raised by the passage, for present purposes, is whether Leibniz's statement, «this unmeasurable combined with other subjects brings it about that all possible modes, or things, follow in it,» ([Kulstad's] emphasis) means that relations to these «other subjects,» whatever they might be, is part of what is intended by Leibniz here in accounting for the origin of things from forms or attributes, so that this account would be different from the pure relations theory, which involves, as we have presented it, relations among forms or attributes alone. In fact, it seems fairly clear that this passage does add a new class of 'relata' to the account of the origin of things. [Kulstad 1999, p. 81]

Certainly, the “subjects theory” is named after this expression of “other subjects,” and the expression also made Kulstad consider Adams' “insightful comments” on the passage of the subjects theory (ibid.). Adams notes the expression “subjects,” saying that Leibniz may have oscillated between monistic and pluralistic options of metaphysics:

What is new here is the distinction of “subjects.” Combined with the single divine subject, the simple forms constitute God; “combined with other subjects,” the forms constitute derivative things. This is exactly the way in which most of us would intuitively expect ontological externality to be maintained in a pluralistic metaphysics - though it is strangely combined in this passage with the surviving characterization of derivative things as “Modes, or Things in it,” which presumably means things “in” the divine subject. [Adams 1994, p. 130]

Adams suggests that Leibniz was in the process of forming a stable system of metaphysics, introducing different ideas to see how they fit together. Consequently, two components, which seemingly have tensions with respect to each other, show up in the same passage. On the one hand, Leibniz suggests that all finite things are modifications, and God is the only substance. Here finite things and God clearly belong to different categories. On the other hand, Leibniz also suggests that finite things are subjects that can be related to a greater subject, namely God. Finite things, together with God, are taken to be subjects, and to this extent they are in the same status.

### 1.3 Matter Theory

Kulstad lastly offers the matter theory, and it is introduced on the basis of the following passage:

However, it is true that there cannot exist any modifications, either in space or in the mind, except with the help of matter, whose nature it is to combine the two. But matter being given, then there exist modifications in the mind and in that which is extended. [A VI iii, 514 = DSR 75]

At a first glance, the matter theory is different from the subjects theory. The matter theory requires matter in addition to simple forms, whereas according to the subjects theory, finite things seem to need subjects and simple forms. Kulstad introduces Leibniz's theory of imperfection in explaining the ontological status of matter that is discussed in the quoted passage. Kulstad states that according to Leibniz's later view (especially, I think, one proposed in *Discourse on Metaphysics* and letters to Arnauld),<sup>5</sup> "possible finite substances have complete concepts involving limited versions of the unlimited perfections of God" (Kulstad 1999, p. 83). Since "only God is entirely free" of imperfection, any created substance has some imperfection, and hence it is limited in power, knowledge, and moral perfection. This imperfection is called "matter." Though Kulstad is careful enough to avoid arguing that we can interpret DSR on the basis of later texts, he still argues that the matter theory fits "tolerably well" with it (ibid.). Indeed, finite things in the framework of DSR are limited in some aspects. For instance, an extended body is limited in that it has a specific shape and size. It cannot have an infinite extension, and thus limited in some area. And extended bodies cannot be distinguished only through the attribute of extension, since different extended bodies are all extended. Hence according to the matter theory, with a mediation of matter, two extended bodies are "embodied" as different ones, having different shapes. Likewise, human minds are limited in perceptions in the sense that they cannot have completely distinct perceptions. A human mind is also characterized by limitation, which is called matter. Leibniz suggested that matter is necessary for human minds to have specific perceptions such as sensations of various colors (A VI iii, 518 = DSR 77). Here sensations seem to be taken as perceptions that are not completely distinct. More generally, finite things are embodied as individuals through some limitations introduced by matter.

## 2. Attempts to Unify Theories

So far I have attempted to introduce Kulstad's important distinction of three theories that can be found in DSR. But I now want to argue that three theories can perhaps be consistent. Here I do not attempt to refute Kulstad and Laerke, since in fact, both of them do not deny the possibility of seeing the theories as consistent: "Conceivably," Kulstad states, "Leibniz did not mean that the matter theory is distinct from the pure relation theory, or perhaps not even from the subjects theory" (Kulstad 1999, p. 84). Also, he suggests that Leibniz's three

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5 The doctrine of complete individual concept is introduced in the section 13 of *Discourse on Metaphysics* (L 310-1). Leibniz also discussed the original imperfection of a human being in the section 30 (L 321-3).

explanations of how various things arises from forms or attributes of God are “at least nominally different” (Kulstad 1999, p. 78). This expression suggests that these answers might not be utterly distinct in a way that they are incoherent to each other. Similarly, Laerke states that “[t]hese diverse explanations are not exclusive to each other” (Laerke 2008, p. 518).<sup>6</sup> Both of them seem to agree that three theories are not obviously inconsistent in such a way that any interpretation does not allow to take the passages to present the theories as pertaining to one system of metaphysics. Hence my attempt to see a possible consistency of the three theories, I think, is not against what they maintain.

## 2.1 *Unifying the Pure Relations and Subjects Theories*

The two passages to support the pure relations and subjects theories are, in fact, both from *On Simple Forms*. In the very same article, Leibniz wrote that “[t]hings are not produced by the mere combination of forms in God, but along which a subject also,” and he also wrote that “[t]here is the same variety in any kind of world, and this is nothing other than the same essence related in various ways” (A VI iii, 523 = DSR 83-5). Moreover, these two passages are mutually close in the article.<sup>7</sup> Though if the passages are from different articles in *De Summa Rerum*, then Leibniz might have written down inconsistent hypotheses in them, it is hard to believe that Leibniz intentionally wrote inconsistent hypotheses in mutually close passages of the same article.

But for what reason we can take the subjects theory to be consistent with the pure relations theory? Here I suggest the distinction of “possible” and “actual” modifications in the framework of DSR. Though Leibniz did not use these terms,<sup>8</sup> I think we can reasonably introduce this distinction following his discussions in DSR. Possible modifications do not exist in the actual world, but they are conceived as such by the perfect intellect of God. In contrast, actual modifications do exist in this world, and they exist as results of God’s power and will that produce them in accordance with possible modifications. In *On the Secret of Sublime* of DSR, Leibniz wrote that God is not “nature, fate, fortune, necessity, the world,” but he is “a certain substance, a person, a mind” (A VI iii, 475 = DSR 27). Also, in *On the Truths, the Mind, God, and the Universe* of DSR, Leibniz explicitly wrote that a finite mind is “created by God,” and it exists and remains “by the will of God” (A VI iii, 512 = DSR 65-7). In these passages, Leibniz suggests that God is a person who has a will to create finite things that he conceives. Moreover, at the beginning of *On the Secret of Sublime* from DSR, he wrote that “something exists, and all possibles cannot exist” (A VI iii, 472 = DSR 21). Leibniz obviously did not hold that all possible things exist, as Spinoza did. We can understand that according to Leibniz of DSR, God chooses some possible things out of others to actualize. Hence we can conceive of the distinction between actual things created by God, on the one hand, and possible things that are not actualized by him, on the other.

6 “[c]es explications diverses ne sont pas exclusives les unes des autres....”

7 I only find seven lines of words between two passages in the translation of G.H.R. Parkinson.

8 Leibniz only used the expression “possible mode” in the passage of the subjects theory.

Given my distinction, I suggest that according to the passage of the subjects theory, possible modifications are given through relations of the form of extension to the other forms, and these possible modifications are actualized by God's power and will to create them. I think in the passage of the subjects theory Leibniz took "the immeasurable" as the form of extension, and he seems to discuss combinations of the extension with other forms or attributes. In the passage of the subjects theory, Leibniz stated that "[t]he subject itself, or God, together with his ubiquity, gives the immeasurable, and this immeasurable combined with other subjects bring it about that all possible modes, or things, follow in it" (A VI iii, 523 = DSR 85). By paying special attention to the immeasurable, Laerke argues that Leibniz assumes that the immeasurable is nothing but the attribute of absolute extension. In *On the Origin of Things from Forms* of DSR, Leibniz seems to assume that "the immeasurable (immensum)," "absolute extension (extensum absolutum)," and "the expanded (expansum)" refer to an indivisible foundation of the space (A VI iii, 519 = DSR 77-9; Laerke 2008, p. 470). "Absolute extension" is contrasted with the space in the sense that the space has a quantitative extension, while absolute extension does not (ibid.). Also, the space is composed of parts and changes, whereas the absolute extension is not composed and changed (Laerke 2008, pp. 470-1 cf. A VI iii, 391). Now if the immeasurable is understood to be the attribute of extension, which I found fairly convincing, then it seems that it is God having the form of extension,<sup>9</sup> not God as a subject, is needed for producing possible modifications. Here relations of the extension to "other subjects" seem to be sufficient for bringing about possible modifications.

But the subjects theory still seems to be distinct from the pure relations theory, since it seems that "other subjects," in addition to combinations of simple forms, are needed to produce particular modifications. As we have seen, Adams suggests that "other subjects" in the passage of the subjects theory are subjects of finite things, and each subject underlies some finite individual. Against Adams, I follow Laerke's interpretation of the passage, according to which "other subjects" do not refer to subjects that are really distinct from God. In response to Adams' interpretation, Laerke argues that another reading of the passage is possible. For Laerke, though "the passage is very obscure and it allows diverse interpretations,"<sup>10</sup> Adams' reading is not the only possible interpretation on the basis of the texts, and it is not "perhaps the most coherent"<sup>11</sup> among possible readings (Laerke 2008, p. 532). Laerke goes on to argue that Adams' interpretation has a problem, that is, his interpretation introduces another category in Leibniz's ontology of DSR, a "fourth ontological category" that is different from God, simple forms, and things (Laerke 2008, p. 532). "Subjects" need to be distinct from things, since they are requirements of producing things. It seems that a subject is embodied as a thing by having some properties through relations. But it is difficult to find evidence to show that Leibniz introduced this fourth category in other texts. To avoid this interpretation problem,

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9 Kulstad pays more attention to the distinction of "ubiquity" and "the immeasurable," and states that the former is "a term Leibniz uses for one of the forms or attributes of God," and the latter is "a term Leibniz uses to refer to God insofar as God has the attribute of ubiquity" (Kulstad 1999, p. 81).

10 "Le passage est assez obscure et il se prête à des interprétations diverses."

11 "Ce n'est cependant pas la seule possibilité d'interprétation et ce n'est peut-être pas la plus cohérente."

Laerke proposes to take a subject to be God insofar as having some simple attribute:

Therefore it is the subject itself or God, *insofar as having absolute extension*, that has to be related to other subjects. This restriction allows us to understand the expression “the other subjects” differently from what Adams understood.... Thus the “other subjects” are, for instance, “God insofar as having absolute thought,” or “God insofar as such and such attribute.”<sup>12</sup> [Laerke 2008, p. 534]

According to Laerke’s reading, Leibniz did not introduce a plurality of really distinct subjects in the passage of the subjects theory. By using the term “subjects,” Leibniz eventually referred to the only subject God. In this reading, God is taken as different subjects, insofar as he has many distinct attributes. God as having extension, for instance, is conceptually distinct from God as having thought. I think Laerke’s interpretation is worth considering, given that in the passage of the subjects theory Leibniz declared that things are produced “along with a subject,” and that “various results of forms” are “combined with a subject.” It seems that Leibniz means to emphasize that one subject is needed. If we assume that Leibniz suddenly declared that many subjects are required for producing modifications, his statement seems to be out of the context of the whole passage.

It is still true that Laerke also assumes that the subjects theory is distinct from the pure relations theory. Why? Since according to the subjects theory, God as the subject of forms (especially that of extension) is required, in addition to many forms or attributes to produce modifications. But I interpret the passage of the subjects theory as implying that possible modifications are actualized by God as the subject having the power to produce things. I especially take note of the statement that “[t]he various results of forms, combined with a subject, bring it about the particulars result.” Here it seems that various results are distinguished from particulars. What is the difference between them? In my reading, “particulars” are concrete and actual particular things which exist in the actual world. “Various results” are, I think, possible finite things before created by God, who grasps what finite things are by “mere combination” of forms, especially utilizing the form of extension. Then he creates finite things as they are, by utilizing his power, and actualize them. In my reading, God is needed as a subject when possible modifications are actualized. As the pure relations theory implies, possible modifications are given as possibles through mere combinations of forms. But this does not mean that God as a subject is not needed for actualizing them. In my interpretation, God as having power and will is needed for producing actual modifications. I understand the pure relations theory as asserting that possible, not actual, modifications are given through relations of forms, which seems to be consistent with an implication of the passage of the subjects theory that possible modifications are given by relations of the form of extension to the other forms.

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12 “C’est donc le sujet lui-même ou Dieu, *en tant qu’étendue absolue*, qui doit être rapporté aux autres sujets. Cette restriction nous permet de comprendre l’expression «les autres sujets» différemment que ne le fait Adams.... Donc que les «autres sujets» sont, par exemple, «Dieu en tant que pensée absolue» ou «Dieu en tant que tel ou tel attribut».”



## 2.2 Unifying the Matter Theory with the Others

The passage of the matter theory is from *On the Origin of Things from Forms*, while that of the pure relations theory is from *On Simple Forms*. They don't belong to the same article. But in fact, we can find a passage from *On the Origin of Things from Forms*, in which Leibniz gave a suggestion that is remarkably similar to what he said in the passage of the pure relations theory:<sup>13</sup>

It seems to me that the origin of things from God is of the same kind as the origin of properties from an essence; just as  $6 = 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1$ , therefore  $6 = 3 + 3$ ,  $= 3 \times 2$ ,  $= 4 + 2$ , etc. Nor may one doubt that the one expression differs from the other, for in one way we think of the number 3 or the number 2 expressly, and in another way we do not; but it is certain that the number 3 is not thought of by someone who thinks of six units at the same time. [A VI iii, 518-9 = DSR 77]

Here Leibniz asserted that many distinct properties arise from one essence, which is fairly close to a claim of the passage of the pure relations theory that variety is “nothing other than the same essence related in various ways.” Given that the passage of the matter theory is also from *On the Origin of Things from Forms*, it is difficult to see how Leibniz intentionally wrote inconsistent hypotheses in the very same article. It seems to me that Leibniz was trying to show a consistent picture of metaphysics in the article, and thus it is worthwhile to attempt to read the passages of the two theories as mutually consistent. Therefore it may be a mistake to suppose that the matter theory obviously contradicts the pure relations theory.

But how can the matter theory be coherent with the pure relations theory? Here I take note of Leibniz's statement that “change and matter, i.e., modifications, are what result from all other forms taken together” (A VI iii, 522 = DSR 83). Previously, Leibniz noted that “[p]erception and situation are simple forms,” suggesting that by the term “form” he meant simple form or attribute. Leibniz seems clearly to endorse the idea that matter results from relations of simple forms. I also take note of the passage in which Leibniz suggests that negative affections are given by many simple forms or attributes. Though Leibniz did not use the term “matter,” I think it provides a clue to understand how matter is given in the framework of DSR:

Every purely affirmative attribute is infinite; or, it is as great as it can be, or contains all the things that belong to its genus. There are necessarily several affirmative primary attributes; for if there were only one, only one thing could be understood. It seems that negative affections can arise only from a plurality of affirmative attributes—for example, thought and extension. For as it is impossible for something extended to be thought without variety, it follows that certain modes of extension are necessary, and that all those which

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<sup>13</sup> Laerke also takes the passage from *On the Origin of Things from Forms* as supporting the pure relations theory (Laerke 2008, p. 523).

have been, are, or will be can be thought by one being. From this the origin and necessity of modification is evident. [A VI iii, 573-4 = DSR 93]

So, Leibniz suggests that thought can be negated by extension, and vice versa. It seems that a thinking thing can have a negative affection of “non-extended.” And Leibniz seems to suggest that modes or modifications of extension are embodied with negative affections that are given by a plurality of affirmative attributes. Also, Leibniz suggests that a mind needs matter to have specific perceptions, such as a sensation of red color (A VI iii, 518 = DSR 77). Since matter consists in relations, this claim seems to suggest that specific perceptions are given by relations of simple forms, and in my reading, they are brought about by negative affections given by many simple forms.

Hereby I think that matter or limitation is introduced through relations of forms or attributes. In other words, one attribute can be limited by other attributes. If so, the matter theory could be explained in terms of relations of attributes. The view that one attribute is limited by other attributes is utterly inconsistent with Spinoza’s metaphysics, according to which each attribute is independent of any other attribute. But I think that Leibniz’s view in DSR is at most “quasi-Spinozistic,” if we are to use Laerke’s term, and that it is entirely possible that Leibniz did not accept some of Spinoza’s claims.<sup>14</sup>

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## Abbreviations

- A = *G. W. Leibniz: Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe*, edited by the Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften. Darmstadt/Leipzig/Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1923-. Cited by series, volume, and page.
- DSR = *G. W. Leibniz. De Summa Rerum*, translated by G.H.R. Parkinson. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992.
- Ethics = *B. Spinoza: Ethics*, cited by book and axiom (A), definition (D), or proposition (P), followed by a page number from *A Spinoza Reader: The Ethics and Other Works*, ed. and trans. by Edwin Curley, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994.
- L = *G. W. Leibniz. Philosophical Papers and Letters*, trans. and ed. by Leroy E. Loemker. 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. Dordrecht and Boston: Reidel, 1969.

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14 As we have seen, Leibniz wrote that God is not “nature, fate, fortune, necessity, the world,” but he is “a certain substance, a person, a mind” (A VI iii, 475 = DSR 27). Here Leibniz seems to keep a distance from Spinoza’s pantheistic view that everything necessarily follows from God. Also, Leibniz explicitly criticized Spinoza in DSR, saying that an individual mind does not extinguish with its body (A VI iii, 510 = DSR 61 cf. Ethics 5P23).